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25 September 1951

SUBJECT: NIE-33: SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN  
SATELLITES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO  
SOVIET POWER

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the effectiveness of Soviet control over the  
Eastern European Satellites and Soviet Success in reorganizing  
these states and in increasing their economic and military contribu-  
tions to Soviet strength, through mid-1953.

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Soviet Russian control over the Eastern European Satellites is virtually complete, assuring the tractability and reliability of these states, their ultimate transformation into the Soviet form, and increased political, economic, and military benefit to the Soviet Union. We believe that present Soviet authority and its expected increase will enable the Soviet Union and its Satellite governments to control both those forces deriving from Eastern European tradition and those which are caused directly by the imposition of the Soviet system until the present balance of power has shifted or until the Soviet Union has suffered serious reverses in a general war.

2. Rapid collectivization is considered the most serious future hazard to Soviet control, but the decision to effect this is not expected within the period covered by this estimate.

3. The forcible addition to the Soviet Orbit of the Eastern European Satellites has increased Soviet power, prestige, and influence, strengthened the conviction of Communists outside the Orbit that Communism constitutes the wave of the future, and terrorized resistance outside the Orbit to Soviet tactics and pressures.

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4. The Eastern European Satellites now constitute valuable colonies for the Soviet Union. Reorganized along the Soviet pattern with a heavy emphasis on industrialization, they export to the Soviet Union large, often vital quantities of raw materials and industrial goods, notably uranium ores and concentrates, petroleum products, industrial chemicals, and engineering equipment; for example, the Satellites in 1950 supplied 67 percent of the Orbit's uranium ores and concentrates and approximately 20 percent of the Soviet Union's engineering equipment.

5. Satellite exports to the West have provided the Soviet Union and the Soviet-Satellite complex the means for acquiring crucial materials and equipment difficult and even impossible for the Soviet Union to obtain directly. The present dependence of some Western states upon the Satellites for grains, timber, and coal prevents Western export restrictions from eliminating this advantage entirely.

6. The rising curve of Satellite industrial production began to flatten out in the first half of 1951, and future planned increases are profoundly compromised by shortages. Deficiencies in labor and management efficiency, raw materials, and capital equipment will continue to limit Soviet progress toward the goal of Orbit autarky.

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7. The industrial capacity and general economic strength of the Satellites will remain low in comparison with those of Western Europe, although the Satellites will be able to divert a higher proportion of their industrial production to military uses.

8. The Satellites provide a buffer and a base for the Soviet Union. The 468,500 Red Army troops and 2,670 Soviet-manned aircraft stationed in the Satellites constitute the spearhead of Soviet strength.

9. The Satellite armies are now estimated to number 862,000 men, organized into 65 divisions, of which 4 are armored and 9 mechanized. These forces have grown in size 30 percent from January, 1950 through mid-1951, and we believe they will increase an additional 70 percent by mid-1953.

10. The Satellite Air Forces are now of negligible capabilities. The Soviets are engaged in their sound and rapid development, and in an extensive program of air field improvement and construction, but these projects will probably not be completed within the period of this estimate.

11. A concerted attack upon Yugoslavia by Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Albania or armed support <sup>by them</sup> to an uprising in Yugoslavia, are considered unlikely unless the Soviets have decided to accept the high risk of a general war.

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12. Great differences exist in the training, equipment, morale, and general capabilities of the Satellite armies. The Bulgarian army is the most loyal and formidable, but even it is not yet a completely reliable Soviet instrument and must rely upon the Soviets for logistical support. The Hungarian and Rumanian armies may approach the Bulgarian standard by the end of 1952, the Czechoslovak and Polish armies by the end of 1953. The formation of the Eastern German army has, in effect, just begun.

13. The Bulgarian army is almost fully equipped with Soviet material, but the program for supplying the other Satellite armies with Soviet equipment will not be completed within the period of this estimate. There is very little equipment available for reserves. This deficiency and the unreliability and poor morale of these armies indicate that their estimated size is not an accurate gauge of their power.

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## CONTROL

### Degree of Control

1. Soviet control over the Eastern European Satellites is virtually complete. It ensures the tractability and reliability of the regimes established there, their reorganization into the Soviet form, and the increase of industrial and agricultural production and of military power for the benefit of the Soviet Union.

2. Soviet Russia has maintained and will enlarge its authority over these Satellites through political, economic, and ideological means and through the skillful and experienced use of police and military power.

a. Although the Soviets have already decapitated and pulverized the old political parties and opposition groups, the discontent now current in each Satellite will persist and perhaps increase.

b. All but trusted Stalinists have been eliminated from the Communist hierarchies, but this is a perpetual process and there will continue to be purges within the Communist Parties, governments, armies, and police forces of each of these Satellites.

c. Present Soviet authority, the power of the Russian advisers and missions in the Satellite governments, Soviet

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economic and military controls, the rigorous training and education programs, and judicious use of terror to create the sense of isolation, hopelessness, and physical and moral fear should guarantee the certain conduct of the Satellites.

Instruments and Techniques

3. Nationalization and direct operation by the governments of all of the vital sectors of the Satellite economies simplify Soviet control. Soviet authority over these economies is exercised in addition through reparations arrangements, trade and financial agreements (especially conditional loans), the use of Soviet advisers in key positions throughout the economy, Soviet allocation of materials to implement specific production schedules, joint companies (notably in Rumania, Poland, and Hungary), and the CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance), which functions both as a fine control instrument and as a facade for "joint planning".

4. The Cominform helps to provide effective cooperation among the Satellites, establishing and advancing a uniform political and propaganda creed and assuring Soviet control over those political endeavors involving several or all of the Satellites. The Soviets are determined to strengthen the ties binding the Satellites to the Soviet Union. Although the

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Soviet Government permit and encourage programs of cultural, economic, and technical collaboration among the Satellites, it undoubtedly does not plan to unify them.

5. The secret police and security forces in each of the Satellites are large, carefully-selected, and well-trained. They are infiltrated and often dominated by experienced Soviet personnel.

6. Large Soviet military missions are supervising the reorganization of the Satellite armies, which are adopting standard Soviet methods, doctrine, organization, and equipment. Soviet advisers and technicians are located in key positions in the military forces and defense ministries, and the powers of Soviet generals such as Rokossovsky, Minister of Defense and commander-in-chief in Poland, in effect have added the Satellite armies to the Soviet. The officer corps of each new army has been purged, political indoctrination often occupies as much time and effort as military training, and the Satellite armies will remain dependent upon the Soviet Union for all of their aircraft and for most of their tanks and heavy artillery.

7. Four of these Satellites -- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania -- have a boundary common with that of the Soviet Union. Only Albania lacks a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The final lever of Soviet control consists

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of the Soviet forces stationed within these countries; these forces were estimated in September, 1951, to consist of 468,500 from the Red Army (including military missions), 26,500 security troops, and 2,670 Soviet-manned aircraft. <sup>1/</sup>

Troublesome Issues and Forces

8. A number of issues and forces remain which will constitute irritations for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but which will not jeopardize Soviet authority. Six of these -- nationalism, the traditional hatred of Russia (except in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria), a western cultural tradition (especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), religion, territorial conflicts among the Satellites, and racial or religious minorities within the Satellites -- derive from the history of this area. Three -- the imposition of the Soviet system, Soviet economic exploitation of the area, and the general decline of an already depressed standard of living -- are direct products of the recent changes. The Soviets in the past have shown such skill and resolution with these issues and in discovering and obliterating

<sup>1/</sup> For further detail concerning Soviet forces stationed in the Eastern European Satellites, see Appendix A.

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hostile forces that none is expected to develop into more than a nuisance or an impediment upon the tempo and quality of the Communist program within the period of this estimate.

9. The Communists are committed by their philosophy and by their political and economic position in Eastern Europe to the collectivization of agriculture, which has generally been proceeding very slowly. <sup>1/</sup> A sharp increase in the rate of collectivization constitutes the most serious potential danger the Soviets face within these Satellites, since many elements of current policy, particularly the rigorous and discriminatory controls, have already alienated the peasantry.

a. An increase of this kind is not anticipated within the next two years because:

1. Current controls are adequate.
2. The ability of the Satellites to increase these controls and to improve their effectiveness should enable them to attain planned agricultural production, collection quotas, and manpower relocation and redistribution.

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<sup>1/</sup> As of January, 1951, the percentage of arable land which had been collectivized in each of the Eastern European Satellites was the following: Eastern Germany, 1; Poland, 1.5; Czechoslovakia, 22.3; Hungary, 13.9; Albania, 6.3; Rumania, 13.1; Bulgaria, 50. Collectivization has not been increased significantly in any country in 1951.

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3. The hazards involved do not justify the risk within this period.

b. Should a serious miscalculation be made in hastening collectivization, the danger would be especially serious in Poland, where hostility to Russia has always been greatest and where other resentments already felt would increase.

c. Soviet control of the commanding heights is so firm, however, that an upheaval even in such circumstances is most unlikely. The overwhelming power of the Soviets and their instruments and the fatigue, degradation, and demoralization created by the system are eliminating hope for effective resistance, until the present disparity in the military power of the West and the Soviet Orbit has been eliminated or until the Soviet Union has suffered serious reverses in a general war.

#### SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET STRENGTH

##### POLITICAL

1. The addition to the Soviet Orbit of the Eastern European Satellites has strengthened the conviction of Communists outside the Orbit that the Revolution is more than Russian and that Communism constitutes the wave of the future. It has increased Soviet power, prestige, and influence in the UN and in other international

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organizations, and it may provide support for a new Soviet-controlled rival to the UN.

2. Soviet control of Eastern Europe, and the manner in which that control was acquired and is exercised, have helped to undermine resistance outside the Orbit, especially in Western Europe, to Soviet tactics and pressures.

### ECONOMIC

#### Purpose of Long-Term Plan

1. Throughout the first three years after the conclusion of hostilities, the Soviet Union ruthlessly extracted from Eastern Europe the obtainable immediate economic profits. The means used included outright requisition of materials and equipment and the imposition of bi-lateral trade pacts on terms overwhelmingly advantageous to the USSR. A revised program which went into effect late in 1948 provided for the carefully-planned economic integration of these industrialized <sup>countries</sup> into the Soviet economic system to achieve the following results:

- a. Control of these countries and of their economic development by the Soviet Union.
- b. Maximum Satellite contribution of their resources and production to Soviet economic and military strength.

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c. Economic dependence of these Satellites upon the USSR and their independence from the West, depriving the West of the economic advantages it formerly enjoyed in Eastern Europe.

d. Continued development of the Satellite economies along lines most beneficial to the USSR, particularly so that the Orbit may become an independent economic entity.

e. Completion of the political and social revolution necessary for the establishment of Soviet Communism.

f. Development of Satellite strength so that the Satellites, or a group of them, may have the capability of conducting localized war and so that the Satellites may make their maximum contribution to Soviet strength in a general war.

## CEMA

2. The reorganization of the economies of the Satellites is one of the functions of CEMA, which provides the machinery for integrating each national economy with that of the USSR, allocating raw materials, capital equipment, and foreign exchange, and arranging specialization and the division of labor. The Satellites import from the USSR some of the raw materials and capital goods necessary for industrialization, but the industries

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developed are those which can contribute most to the economic potential of the USSR. The Satellites have thus been forced into an artificial pattern of production and trade.

Industrial Program

3. A very high percentage of Satellite national income and of the Five-Year Plan budget is devoted to the expansion of industrial capacity, particularly in heavy industry. In Bulgaria, for example, 80 percent of the investment funds for the 1949-1953 period has been assigned to heavy industry and the extractive fields. Forty percent of Czechoslovakia's capital investment for 1949-1953 is in industry, and the Eastern German annual percentage rises from 51 to 55 from 1951 through 1955.

4. The goals for each country indicate the revolutionary character of the changes planned and the consequent increasing size of the contributions Soviet Russia expects each to make to Soviet strength. For example, the present plan provides for an increase of industrial production in Poland in 1955 of 58 percent over that of 1949. Sixty percent of the national income of Poland is to be derived from industry in 1955, compared with 49 percent in 1949. In Hungary, industry's share of the national income is scheduled to rise from 51 percent in 1949 to 64 percent in 1954. Industrial production in 1953 in Czechoslovakia is to be 50 percent greater than that of 1949, and heavy industrial production in 1955

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is planned to be 231 percent greater than that of 1948. Present plans schedule Eastern Germany's industrial production in 1955 as 190 percent of that of 1950.

5. This long-range program has been designed in such a way that the industrial base, general economic strength, and military power of each country should increase each year. The Eastern European Satellites are in a progressively advancing state of war-readiness.

Principal Economic Contributions

6. The principal economic contributions of the Eastern European Satellites to Soviet Russia consist of the increasing flow of certain raw materials and of finished equipment to Russia. <sup>1/</sup> The following are the most important:

a. The Satellites in 1950 supplied approximately 67 percent of the Soviet Orbit's uranium ores and concentrates, with Eastern Germany accounting for 45 percent, Czechoslovakia 15 percent, Bulgaria 4 percent, and Poland 3 percent.

b. Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland export to the USSR approximately 50 percent of the total annual production of their engineering industries, or an

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<sup>1/</sup> The table in Appendix B indicates the production in 1950 of various selected raw materials and manufactured equipment by the Satellites, as compared with the production of those materials and products by the Soviet Union.

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amount equal to about 25 percent of Soviet annual production. Some items, notably electronic equipment, electric motors, diesel engines, industrial instruments, and machine tools, constitute a particularly important contribution to Soviet industrial and military expansion because of the highly skilled labor involved in their manufacture. In addition, East German and Czechoslovakian exports of industrial equipment to other Satellites increase the capacity of those countries for supplying the USSR.

c. Over 50 percent of the petroleum products produced by the Satellites is furnished the Soviet Union for export, stockpiling, and the supply of Soviet forces within the area. About 4.1 million tons of petroleum products refined from crude oil were made available to the USSR in 1950 by the Satellites, compared with Soviet production in 1950 of 3.4 million tons of petroleum products, and a larger amount will be available in 1951.

d. The chemical industries in the Satellite area make an important direct contribution to the Soviet war potential, with Eastern Germany and the Polish coke-chemical industry providing the largest shares. The Satellites export to the Soviet Union a substantial proportion of the chemicals used directly in the Soviet manufacture of

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explosives; the chemicals of which Satellite production is most significant in relation to Soviet output include synthetic ammonia (71 percent of the USSR's production); nitric acid (32 percent); and sulphuric acid (34 percent).

7. The scientific and technical personnel of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent of Poland and Hungary, constitute a major addition to Soviet capabilities. Although relatively few of these personnel have been moved to the USSR, the products of their skill and studies are of major value to the Soviet economy.

8. The Eastern European Satellites, particularly Poland, serve as media for obtaining from the West and from the Far East materials and equipment which are vital to the Soviet economy and which the USSR itself finds difficult and even impossible to obtain directly. These materials and this equipment, through trade agreements concluded by the Satellites with the West, are obtained by the Soviet Union for its own industries and for Satellite industries working for the Soviet Union. This asset is diminishing due to Western controls over the export of strategic commodities.

9. The inability of the Satellites to obtain the necessary supplies of materials and equipment contributed in 1951 to checking severely the industrialization programs in effect since

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1948 or earlier; the rising curve of industrial production has already begun to flatten out, and future planned increases are profoundly compromised by shortages. It is almost certain that none of the Satellites will fulfill the 1951 production and export schedules, and full success in the Five Year Plans is virtually impossible.

Planned Orbit Autarky

10. The Soviet Orbit is independent to a large extent of outside sources of supply but nevertheless suffers from several serious economic weaknesses and shortages. Changes in basic economic development can be brought about only rather slowly, and current Satellite deficiencies constitute an important limiting factor on Soviet plans to obtain Orbit autarky.

a. The efficiency of labor and management throughout the Satellites is generally low, and the planned expansion of industry far exceeds estimated ability to train skilled workers, technicians, and managers.

b. The Satellites lack adequate supplies of many of the raw materials necessary for the development of a modern industrial economy: high-grade iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, rubber, sulphur and pyrites, and tin are extremely limited in supply. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland do not produce sufficient coal,

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especially coking coal, for an expanded Satellite industrial economy.

c. Hydro-electric projects require equipment which neither the Soviet Union nor the Satellites themselves can provide and which can not now be obtained from the West. Petroleum exploration and drilling equipment, complex automatic machine tools, precision instruments, and machinery for manufacturing antifriction bearings are all vital for fulfillment of the Soviet program for expanded production, and all are now unobtainable.

d. The exportable surpluses of agriculture commodities cannot be increased significantly beyond their present levels, for each regime has already rationed its consumers to the barest subsistence level and cannot increase agricultural production without additional agricultural equipment and another hazardous wave of revolution.

e. The critical materials and equipment are also now in short supply within the Soviet Union itself though the bulk of the materials which the USSR now supplies to the Satellites -- iron ore, some ferrous-alloys, salt for the chemical industry, and cotton -- are not critical items in the Soviet Union.

Comparison of Eastern and Western Europe

11. The fundamental factors underlying the relative economic

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strengths of Eastern and Western Europe, and of the Soviet Orbit and the West, are unlikely to change significantly by mid-1953. The productive capabilities and economic resources of Satellite Europe are low in comparison with those of Western Europe, as those of the entire Orbit are in comparison with those of the West. The total gross national income of the Western European states (including Western Germany) is more than three times as great as that of the Eastern European Satellites, and the estimated rates of growth of the economies through mid-1953 are almost identical. The Eastern European Satellites are believed able to devote a higher proportion of their national income to military production, but the resultant difference in production itself is not significant.

#### MILITARY

1. Control of the Eastern European Satellites has pushed the frontiers of the Soviet Union roughly 500 miles west into Central Europe and has established on Russia's frontiers a buffer zone now garrisoned by 862,000 expendable Satellite troops and 468,500 Soviet troops. This area provides advanced air bases, space for an advanced air defense system, and Baltic naval bases. It constitutes a projecting threat to all of Western Europe, the Scandinavians, and the Near East.

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### Armies

2. The armies of the Eastern European Satellites are now estimated at 862,000 men, and the internal security forces constitute an additional approximate 150,000 men. These armies are now organized into 65 divisions, of which 4 are armored and 9 mechanized. These forces increased in size approximately 30 percent from January 1950 through the summer of 1951. They are growing in strength and quality at an accelerated rate, and it is believed that they will increase an additional 70 percent in size by mid-1953. At that date, they will total about 1,475,000, or 116 divisions, of which 11 will be armored and 18 mechanized.

3. The Soviet Union has begun to reorganize the Satellite armies so that they will conform to the Soviet pattern. Great differences still exist among the Satellite armies in training, equipment, morale, and general capabilities. The Bulgarian army is apparently the most loyal and formidable, although even it is not yet a completely reliable Soviet instrument. Its 13 divisions are almost fully equipped with Soviet materiel, reserve stockpiles are available, and morale is good to excellent. There are approximately 300,000 trained reserves, of whom about 130,000 are sufficiently trained for immediate combat.

4. The present capabilities of the Bulgarian army will not be attained by any other Satellite force before the end of 1952.

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The Rumanian and Hungarian armies most closely approach the Bulgarian standard, but even these armies lack standardized equipment and training and are not considered completely reliable. Only 20 percent of Rumanian equipment, for example, is of Soviet manufacture. The armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany are much less advanced than the Balkan armies. They are not now sufficiently skilled or reliable for independent campaigns, and the Soviet Union could not now rely upon these troops in a general war except for subsidiary duties.

5. The Soviet Union will not be certain of the loyal support of the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Eastern German armies within the period of this estimate. The armies of the other Satellites are now more reliable, but the loyalty of even these armies may be severely shaken when the present disparity in military power of the West and the Orbit has been eliminated or when the Soviet Union has suffered a series of reverses in a general war.

6. The Bulgarian, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Albanian armies combined are more than 50 percent larger than the Yugoslavian army and possess twice as much armor. However, because of the present variations in accomplishment of these Satellite armies in reorganization and training, the promised growth of Yugoslavian military strength, and the Western commitment to Yugoslavia a concerted attack upon Yugoslavia by these Satellites or armed support

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to an uprising in Yugoslavia, are considered unlikely unless the Soviets have decided to accept the high risk of a general war.

7. The Satellite forces are not now fully coordinated. However, the command structures and the Soviet role are such that coordination for operations in the Balkan area in particular could be accomplished quite easily.

8. The Soviets have inaugurated a program for standardizing the equipment of the Satellite armies. The Satellites are now manufacturing for their own use light-armored and non-combat vehicles, light artillery, small arms, ammunition, and parts. They are dependent upon the Soviet Union for most of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy artillery, and for some of their light artillery and small arms.

9. As Appendix C indicates, trained reserves of these Satellites amount to 3,800,000 men. This figure is deceptive, however, because:

a. Few of these men have had recent training or have used Soviet equipment, which will become standard in all of these armies, and few have been subject to the degree of indoctrination sought by the Soviets in the armed forces.

b. The industrialization and militarization programs are causing increasing manpower dislocations, especially in the Satellites most advanced industrially.

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c. There is little equipment available for reserves, except in Bulgaria and except for the equipment and stockpiles of Soviet forces now stationed in Eastern Europe. Even the present Bulgarian Army lacks adequate signal and engineer equipment.

#### Air Forces and Airfields

10. The Satellite Air Forces, whose mission is primarily defensive, are of negligible capabilities when measured even against such lesser air forces as that of Sweden. As Appendix D indicates, only half of the approximately 2,000 aircraft are operational and there are probably only 2000 trained pilots available. The Soviets are now engaged in a sound and increasingly rapid development of these air forces, concentrating at first upon Poland and Hungary. Equipment and aircraft are now practically all of World War II design and construction, but jet fighters are appearing in increasing numbers and intensive Soviet training of carefully selected Satellite pilots is assuring Soviet control, doctrines, techniques, and tactics. The Czechoslovakian and Rumanian air forces are now being completely reorganized and re-built, but these forces will not be reliable and efficient within the period of this estimate.

11. An extensive program of air field improvement and construction is being carried out in all of the Satellites except Albania. There are now 31 1/2 airfields in the Satellite area; 65 of these

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have runways capable of sustained jet and medium-bomber operations. The emphasis is upon Eastern Germany, where 7 fields can now support sustained, and 13 limited, operations by heavy bombers, medium bombers, and jet fighters, and where 21 other fields are being improved. The Eastern German network is the best equipped in the Satellites and provides the most extensive and up-to-date facilities for night-flying and all-weather operations. This network and the Hungarian network already surpass present needs for the aircraft types currently based in those countries.

12. Intensive development in early warning radar networks, radar-controlled anti-aircraft, and civil defense began in the Satellites only in the spring of 1951. Progress has been most notable in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary. Even now, the Satellites possess only small amounts of World War II radar equipment, and spotters are still employed to report aircraft movement. None of the Satellites has trained a modern and effective anti-aircraft command.

#### Navy

13. The capabilities of the Satellite navies are negligible. The USSR has made no effort to improve either their equipment or their organization.

#### Soviet Forces Stationed in the Satellites

14. 468,500 Red Army troops organized in 28 divisions <sup>1/</sup> are

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<sup>1/</sup> Allied divisions are approximately 80 percent larger than Soviet and Satellite divisions, both in T/O and in present numerical strength.

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stationed in the Satellites. The bulk of these forces are concentrated in Eastern Germany and constitute the spearhead of Soviet military strength. Soviet-manned aircraft based in the Satellites now total 2,670, of which 900 are jet fighters, 400 conventional fighters, 580 light bombers, 400 attack bombers, 150 transports, and 150 reconnaissance planes. The largest concentration of these craft is in Eastern Germany, which has 1,280, while Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Austria together have 560, Poland 470, and Rumania 230. There has been no significant increase in the size or quality of these forces during the past two years, except that jet fighters are gradually replacing conventional ones.

Comparison of Eastern and Western Europe

15. The Satellite armies in the summer of 1951 totalled 65 divisions, while the European members of NATO plan 24 divisions by the end of 1951, supported by 6 American divisions in Europe. It is estimated that the Satellite armies will include 116 divisions by the summer of 1953; the Western European countries will then have only 50 divisions.

16. An area's military strength is an infinitely complex subject, for military strength depends in part upon the kind of war to be fought, the rapidity with which conversions can be made from non-military to military production, the type of weapons the area can produce, and the people's morale and will to fight. Satellite

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strength, moreover, cannot be judged independent of that of the USSR, just as the power of Western Europe cannot be separated from that of its allies. In summary, however, because of their deficiencies in equipment, loyalty, and morale, the Satellite armies as such do not now constitute the threat to Western Europe, or <sup>to</sup> Greece, Turkey, and a strengthened Yugoslavia, which their size would appear to indicate.

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APPENDIX A

SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES, SEPT. 1951 <sup>1/</sup>

	Army		Security Troops	Soviet-Manned Aircraft						Total
	No. of Troops	Line Divs.		Fighters Jet Con	Light Bomb.	Attack	Trans.	Rec.		
Eastern Germany	350,000	22 <sup>2/</sup>	20,000	660 0	250	250	60	60	1280	
Poland	55,000	2	2,000	100 150	40	120	30	30	470	
Czechoslovakia	1,000	0	0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	
Hungary	30,000	2	1,500	3/100 150	250	0	30	30	560	
Albania	500	0	0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	
Rumania	30,000	2	2,000	40 100	40	120	30	30	360	
Bulgaria	2,000	0	1,000	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	468,500	28	26,500	900 400	580	490	150	150	2670	

- 1/ There are 33,000 troops, organized in two divisions, and 2,500 security troops stationed in the Soviet Zone of Austria.
- 2/ These divisions are organized into four mechanized and two rifle armies. The latter two armies are composed of two corps each.
- 3/ This includes the Soviet air forces stationed in the Soviet zone of Austria.

## APPENDIX B

Production of Selected Commodities by the European Satellites and the USSR  
1950

Commodity	Production (Million Metric Tons)		Satellite Production as Percentage of	
	Satellite	USSR	USSR Production	USSR plus Satellite Production
<b>Ferrous Metals</b>				
Iron Ore	3.500	42.000	8.3	7.7
Pig Iron	4.325	19.500	22.2	18.1
Raw Steel	6.775	25.400	26.7	21.1
Metallurgical Coke	5.470	25.500	21.0	17.7
<b>Nonferrous Metals</b>				
Copper	0.050	0.265	18.9	15.9
Lead	0.061	0.095	64.2	39.1
Zinc	0.107	0.105	102.0	50.5
Antimony	0.003	0.005	60.0	37.5
Bauxite	0.600	0.750	80.0	44.5
Aluminum	0.018	0.240	7.5	7.0
<b>Coal</b>				
Hard	100.143	187.150	53.6	34.9
Brown and Lignite	189.230	74.850	253.0	71.7
<b>Petroleum</b>				
Crude Oil	7.230 <sup>a</sup>	37.500	19.3	16.2
Petroleum Products	6.300 <sup>b</sup>	34.230 <sup>b</sup>	12.4	15.5
Synthetics	1.400	1.530	91.5	47.8 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>/ Includes the Soviet Zone of Austria.<sup>b</sup>/ From crude only.<sup>c</sup>/ Includes products from shale and synthetics.

APPENDIX B

Production of Selected Commodities by the European Satellite and the USSR  
1950  
(Continued)

Commodity	Production (Million Metric Tons)		Satellite Production as Percentage of	
	Satellite	USSR	USSR Production	USSR plus Satellite Production
<u>Chemicals</u>				
Ammonia (Synthetic)	0.386	0.534	73.0	42.0
Nitric Acid (100%)	0.230	0.715	32.0	24.0
Sulphuric Acid	0.949	2.800	34.0	25.0
Toluol	0.020	0.053	37.7	27.4
Chlorine	0.222	0.218	102.0	30.0
Carbide	0.794	0.250	318.0	76.0
Synthetic Rubber	0.040	0.200	20.0	17.0
<u>Metals</u>	N.A. d/	N.A. d/	200.0	67.0
<u>Artificial Abrasives</u>	0.017	0.030	57.0	36.0
<u>Agricultural Products</u>				
Grain	36.100	82.000	44.0	30.5
Meat	2.107	3.386	62.0	39.0
Sugar	2.718	2.100	129.0	56.0

d/ Not available for this report.

APPENDIX B

Production of Selected Commodities by the European Satellites and the USSR  
1950  
(Continued)

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Production</u>		<u>Satellite Production as Percentage of</u>	
	<u>Satellite</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>USSR Production</u>	<u>USSR plus Satellite Production</u>
<u>Machinery Items g/</u>				
Antifriction Bearings	9,500,000.0	60,000,000 <u>z/</u>	16.0	13.00
Tractors	28,000.0	100,000 <u>z/</u>	28.0	22.00
Machine Tools	31,000.0	74,000 <u>z/</u>	42.0	30.0
Locomotives	2,100.0	2,720 <u>z/</u>	80.0	43.00
Freight Cars	45,800.0	146,000 <u>z/</u>	31.0	24.00
Trucks	12,000.0	428,000 <u>z/</u>	3.0	2.73
Passenger Cars	34,000.0	65,000 <u>z/</u>	52.0	34.00
<u>Heavy Electrical Machinery g/</u>	500.0	1,400	36.0	27.00
<u>Electron Tubes g/</u>	15.0	29	52.0	34.00
<u>Electric Lamps g/</u>	97.0	120	81.0	45.00
<u>Electric Power g/</u>	42.3	85	49.7	33.20

g/ Quantities are calculated on the following basis: machinery items, units; heavy electrical machinery, thousand kilowatts; electron tubes and electric lamps, million units; electric power, billion kilowatt-hours.

z/ Estimated production.

g/ Planned production.



APPENDIX C

DEVELOPMENTS OF SAFETY ARMS

Summer 1951									
Country	Divisions				Security Troops & Frontier Guards	Divisions			
	Total	Arm.	Mech.	Rifle		Total	Arm.	Mech.	Rifle
Albania	45,000	0	0	4	4	55,000	0	0	4
Bulgaria	145,000	2	0	11	13	305,000	3	0	12
Rumania	205,000	1	1	12	15	495,000	2	3	14
Hungary	100,000	1	1	7	9	300,000	2	3	7
Czech	135,000	0	2	7	10	865,000	0	6	12
Poland	180,000	0	4	12	16	820,000	4	6	12
DDR	52,000	0	0	0	0	98,000	0	0	24
TOTAL	862,000	4	9	52	65	2,938,000	11	18	77

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APPENDIX D  
SATELLITE AIR FORCES  
Summer, 1951

Country	Fighters			Bomb-ers		Transports	Reconnaissance	Trainers & Others	Total	Operational	Pilots	Total A.F. Personnel
	Jet	Conventional	Attack	Light	Medium							
EASTERN GERMANY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POLAND <sup>1/</sup>	36	182	160	71	0	14	26	82	571	296	?	10,700
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	15	156	45	40		41	37	397	731	300	300	8,000
HUNGARY		145	90	0	0	4	0	102	341	235	660	5,700
ALBANIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ROMANIA	0	115	70	15	0	15	65	78	358	230	?	12,000
BULGARIA	0	100	100	145	0	30	10	?	385	118	390	7,800
TOTAL	51	693	465	271		104	138	659	2,386	1,179		44,200

<sup>1/</sup> These figures include those for the small Polish Naval Air Force.

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Proposed Revision of Paragraph 9, page 5-6 of NIE-33.  
(Present footnote would be retained.)

9. The collectivization of agriculture has generally been proceeding very slowly in Eastern Europe, <sup>despite the fact that it is</sup> even though it is fundamental in Stalinist philosophy, <sup>(1)</sup> and even though it would ~~destroy the economic foundations of opposition to the Kremlin within the Satellites.~~ (1) A sharp increase in the rate of collectivization would constitute the most serious potential danger to ~~the~~ Soviet control of the Satellites. <sup>A rapid</sup> ~~An increase of this degree~~ is not anticipated within the period of this estimate because current controls are adequate and can be made more effective, <sup>Under such circum-</sup> and because <sup>stances the Kremlin probably estimates that</sup> the hazards involved do not justify the risk.

10. Should a serious miscalculation be made in hastening collectivization, the danger would be especially serious in Poland, where hostility to Russia has been always been greatest and where other resentments already felt would increase. Soviet control is as firm, however, that a serious challenge <sup>to Soviet power</sup> even in ~~such~~ <sup>agricultural production and</sup> circumstances is most unlikely. <sup>The procurement of agricultural</sup> commodities would be disrupted for a period of probably two years.

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